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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PIERCE, E. A. TIFFANY, 
FRED WALT-ERS, and DEWAYNE 
WALTERS, aka WAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
ROBERT W. PEPPER, dba R. W. PEP-
PER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
Defendant 
and 
MAJESTIC CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 
10209 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was commenced by a group of labormen, 
alleged employees of one Robert W. Pepper, hereinafter 
referred to as "Pepper," who claimed that they were not 
paid by Pepper for some of their wages earned while 
working for him. They brought suit against said Pepper, 
their employer, who failed to defend the action, and 
against Majestic Corporation, a Utah Corporation, he;re-
inafter referred to as "Majestic," (whose president is 
Dr. Roy W. Humpherys, hereinafter referred to as "Hum-
pherys"), the owner of the property upon which Pepper 
and his workmen performed certain services which, in 
part, form the basis of the workmen's claim. The suit 
against Pepper was prosecuted by reason of Pepper's 
direct breach of contract. The suit against Majestic 
was prosecuted because Majestic had failed to require 
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of Pepper that he post bond according to the require-
ments of 14-4-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that 
by reason of the penalty provisions set forth in 14-2-2, 
Majestic was jointly liable with the contractor for the 
unpaid wages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Pepper defaulted, but curiously enough, the judg-
ment rendered June lOth says nothing about Pepper's 
liability. Majestic defended on the theories of estoppel, 
release, accord, settlement, satisfaction, and payment. 
The case was tried and a decision was rendered. In the 
court's decision, findings, conclusions, and judgment, the 
issues of estoppel and release of joint obligors were whol-
ly ignored. The holding merely recites that the releases 
given by the workmen, releasing Majestic, were void for 
lack of consideration. Judgment was rendered against 
Majestic only and in favor of the plaintiffs Pierce, Tif-
fany, Fred Walters and De Wayne Walters, in the amounts 
of $510.10, $555.10, $474.48, and $471.23, respectively, to-
gether with interest thereon and costs of court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant Majestic seeks to have the judgment 
of the lower court reversed in its entirety, as to itself, 
and to have judgment of no cause of action entered in 
favor of Majestic and against all of the plaintiffs, and to 
have the costs of this appeal awarded to it. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant Majestic owned certain properties in 
Tooele, Utah upon which the plaintiffs worked. Pepper 
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contracted with Majestic to do certain phases of construc-
tion for agreed amounts. (See exhibit 19 wherein Pepper 
is erroneously called a Sub-Contractor) and in fact 
worked on these projects during part of 1962. Pepper 
hired his own workmen. The plaintiffs were among those 
he hired. How long the workmen had worked for Pepper 
is not ascertainable from the record, but is not an im-
portant fact. They had first worked in Provo, then Moab, 
then Tooele. Things apparently went well between the 
three parties. Majestic the owner, Pepper the con-
tractor, and the workmen the plaintiffs, until August 
13th. According to the agreement between the parties 
(See paragrgaph 4 (e) of Exhibit 19) and the actual 
practice of the parties, the workmen periodically exe-
cuted and delivered written statements stating they had 
been paid their wages and delivered appropriate lien re-
leases to Pepper who in turn delivered the same to Ma-
jestic. Upon delivery he, Pepper, was able to get his 
draws. (See Exhibit No. 10, dated 7 /30/62; Exhibit 11, 
dated 8/6/62; Exhibit 12, dated 8/13/62). This arrange-
ment was in compliance with the contract and worked 
well. This, of course, necessitated Pepper's having enough 
solvency to :float one complete payroll. He couldn't get 
a draw from Majestic on the completed work until he 
himself had paid the workmen therefor, and in fact, 
received their lien waivers, evidencing receipt of pay-
ment of their wages earned. In other words, it wasn't 
Majestic's money that was used to pay for the workmen's 
lien waivers, it was Pepper's. Only after Pepper's money 
had been used to pay the workmen for the completed 
work, could Pepper get paid by Majestic. When Majestic 
then paid Pepper, Pepper could replenish the fund and 
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have money of his own in reserve to pay the next week's 
payroll. Shortly before August 13, Pepper's payroll 
checks started bouncing. 
What the immediate cause of the bouncing check 
.problem was is somewhat vague, but it seemed to have 
been caused by goverment action. Page 213 of the Tran-
script discloses (on line 20 to 24) that the "government 
beat Pepper to the money to pay the workmen." Perhaps 
a treasury seizure or levy depleted the funds to that the 
checks of. Pepper to the workmen wouldn't clear the bank. 
'The matter was obviously one of concern especially to 
the workmen. Until then Dr. Roy W. Humpherys, Ma-
jestic's president, had hardly noticed the workmen, hav-
ing perhaps seen them on the job a few times as Pepper's 
employees, but having never really known their names, 
status, or terms of employment. Trying to unravel the 
record as to how the problem of the bounced checks came 
to the attention of Pepper and Humpherys is interesting 
but unimportant. The fact is simply, that in spite of the 
conflicting evidence, the knowledge of the bounced checks 
did come to the attention of the workmen, Pepper, and 
Humpherys in the course of things, and was the main 
reason for the series of meetings which produced the 
settlement agreement, the efficacy of which is one of the 
major.issues in this law suit. 
At the meeting between. Pepper, Humpherys and the 
workmen the various workmen made demands of Ma-
jestic for their unpaid claims. Trying to find the basis of 
these is an interesting pursuit. Each one of the workmen 
has about three different versions as to what he had com-
ing. While each version turns out to be an unproven con-
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elusion, one version is contained in the separately pub-
lished deposition of each plaintiff. Another version is 
found in the affidavits offered in opposition to the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, and another version 
is found in the testimony given at trial. The testimony at 
trial is most interesting. It indicates that the men don't 
have any affirmative recollection of the number of hours 
they worked during the week after August 13th, but yet 
they claim that Majestic's earlier payment to them cov-
ered only the wages earned after August 13th. They only 
remember presenting a written invoice, which curiously 
turns out to be prepared by Pepper for the workmen who 
themselves could not testify as to the number of hours 
they worked or their rate of pay. The incompetence of 
the compounded hearsay evidence upon which a finding 
was based will be discussed later, but whatever may be 
said for the reliability of the evidence in this respect, the 
fact remains that for each of the men there was approxi-
mately one week's work involved, give or take one or two 
days. These were men who were employed at about 
$100.00 to $150.00 per week. Their wage claim, apart 
from the bounced checks, would have been for less than 
$150.00 each for the wages earned after August 13th. 
Majestic was faced with the demand of the work-
men that Majestic reimburse them for Pepper's bounced 
checks. The workmen were faced with the potential 
counterclaim of Majestic against them for having misled 
Majestic by representing not once, but on several occa-
sions, in writing, that they had been paid by Pepper and 
had waived their lien rights, on the basis of which Majes-
tic had permitted Pepper to make progress draws. Ma-
jestic was further faced with the dubious, doubtful, vague 
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"invoices" · prepared by Pepper for some claim by the 
workmen for wages that the workmen themselves, much 
less Majestic knew nothing about. At the conclusion of 
the demands and counter-demands, the parties entered 
into a beautifully simple, uncomplicated agreement: Ma-
jestic as one party, Pepper as another party, and the 
Workmen separately as third parties simply agreed that 
Majestic would not question the invoices of the workmen, 
but pay them at face value. The workmen would, upon 
receiving payment, completely and fully release Majestic 
from any further liability and Pepper would pay to the 
~ 
workmen any residual claim that they might have. 
The. agreements were fully executed on all sides. 
Written releases were prepared by Majestic and signed 
by the workmen, which notwithstanding the inadequacies 
of the language thereof, were understood, according to the 
testimony given at the trial not only by Humpherys, but 
also each of the workmen and Pepper to be the document 
whch evidenced the complete, unequivocal and final re-
lease of Majestic from further liability. Humpherys paid 
without questioning the full amount of the invoices, to 
these men who might have each had a claim of $100 to 
$150 for a week's wages, the sum of $208.93 to Fred 
Walters, the sum of $276.13 to Wayne Walters, the sum of 
$228.13 to R. R. Pierce, and the sum of $167.50 to E. A. 
Tiffany. Pepper, the party who agreed to pay any residue 
did not pay and was sued. A default has been entered 
against him and the plaintiffs may obtain a judgment 
against him at their pleasure. 
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THE PARTIES PLAINTIFF ARE BY THEIR OWN· 
ACTIONS E.STOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY 
CLAIMS OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT MAJESTIC. 
Estoppel is concisely defined by Williston on Con-
tracts, Third Edition, Volume 1, Section 139, Page 601, 
as follows: 
"The vital principle is, that he who, by his lan-
guage or conduct, leads another to do what he 
would not otherwise have done, shall not subject 
such persons to loss or injury by disappointing 
the expectations upon which he acted." · 
Nothing could better describe the facts in this case. 
The plaintiffs all joined in signing a series of hand-writ-
ten lien waivers for R .. W. Pepper, the last of which was 
dated August 13th, 1962. These same lien waivers, evi-
dencing payment were used by Pepper to exhibit to Ma-
jestic to obtain his progress draws. Majestic acting in 
reliance thereupon issued a series of checks to Pepper, 
the last two of which were issued on August 13th and 
August· 15th, 1962. Had the plaintiffs not signed these 
lien waivers, Pepper could not have obtained his draws 
from Majestic. Now the plaintiffs say they weren't paid 
because their· various checks from Pepper, the last of 
which were also dated August 13th, 1962, bounced. While 
this is extremely regrettable, one is forced to observe that 
Pepper's checks weren't legal tender to the workmen, and 
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they didn't have to sign lien waivers or anything else un-
til they had been paid in legal tender. If by their own 
election and in reliance upon previous favorable experi-
ence with Pepper's checks, they accepted the checks of 
Pepper instead of legal tender as their pay, they cannot 
be heard to complain, and if their representations have 
been relied upon by Majestic in disbursing to Pepper, the 
courts will close its ears to the plaintiffs' wailing and tell 
them in the future not to sign any more representations 
that they have been paid, until they have either been 
paid in legal tender, can be sure that their checks will 
clear, or are willing to assume the risk of looking solely 
to the maker of the checks for satisfaction. Had Majestic 
only known that Pepper's checks were bouncing and that 
the workmen weren't being paid, it would have taken all 
sorts of protective measures to protect not only the work-
men, but itself as well. In this case, the workmen went on 
misleading Majestic because there was not only one 
bouncing check, but a series of bouncing checks, yet the 
workmen went on letting Majestic think that they were 
paid and that all was well. They are now by reason there-
of estopped from changing their story. 
Strangely, the court in its Minute Entry decision, and 
later in its findings, conclusions and judgment brushed 
aside the entire matter of estoppel. This principle alone 
is dispositive of the whole case and renders . moot any 
other issues, facts, or questions involved. Majestic re-
spectively submits that the trial court erred repeatedly 
in overlooking this most important principle, and missed 
a wonderful opportunity to save time, money, and feelings 
when it failed to grant Majestic's motion for summary 
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Taking the documents separately, we find that the 
invoices were admitted and used by the trial court to 
prove the wages the workmen had earned after August 
13th. The invoices were presented by the workmen but 
were prepared by Pepper. Pepper prepared them from 
information furnished him by the workmen who gave 
him their time cards. Following the information from its 
source to the trial court we find this situation: The work-
men presumably knew their hours and rate of pay. They 
told this to Pepper. Pepper prepared the invoices for the 
workmen, based upon what the workmen told Pepper. 
The workmen gave the invoices to Humpherys to tell 
him what Pepper had told them what their hours were 
based on what they had told Pepper. The invoices get 
into evidence for the purpose of clarifying and explain-
ing the background of the releases. Now the invoices 
tell the trial judge what Pepper had told the workmen 
what their ·hours were, based upon information which the 
workmen had told Peper. We can't exactly tell whether 
this is third or fourth-handed hearsay. The bottom part 
of the invoices, where the calculating was done, was torn 
off and thrown away before they were presented to Hum-
pherys. Trying to conquer this plethora of information 
having a pyramided degree of incompetence is interesting 
mental gymnastics, but at the risk of being naive, one 
might ask why all of the deviousness and circuity? Why 
didn't the men simply tell the court how many hours they 
had worked and what their rate of pay was? Had they 
forgotten the number of hours, they could have consulted 
their time cards to refresh their memories. (Pepper testi-
fied that he still had them) . Certainly they hadn't for-
gotten their rate of pay. Pepper was pulled like a rabbit 
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out vof a hai at the' last minute~of the-iri.afto.testifyagainst 
Majestic. Why didn't he bring the men's time ·cards with 
him? 
Focusing our attention on Pepper's bounced checks, 
we find them even less enlightening in proving the plain-
tiffs' case. One check contained $80.00 for a saw rental. 
The trial court having the checks before it in evidence 
simply presumed that they were written.for wages, even 
disregarding the $80.00 saw rental. It is unnecessary to 
trace the genealogy of the checks and prove them un-
worthy of cognizance in proving the number of hours the 
plaintiffs worked and their rate of pay. Pepper also wrote 
the bounced checks, and they are of as little value as the 
invoices in proving the elements of the plaintiff's case. 
What do the invoices and checks tell us about the 
plaintiffs' ·hours and their rate of pay? Nothing - abso-
lutely nothing. The only thing that can be said of the 
checks and invoices is that they exist and formed the 
backdrop against which the release and settlement agree-
ment were negotiated. 
Element No. 5 is also unproven. If rules of evidence 
are to be abandoned and facts like reasonable rate of pay 
are to be judicially noticed, and if decisions are to be de-
cided on the basis of human experience and the laws of 
probability, there is no need to fuss over this point. How-
ever, if we are to retain the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem and the rules of evidence, it shouldn't be asking too 
much to require plaintiffs to prove each element of their 
causes of action. 
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judgment at pre-trial and again when it failed to grant 
Majestic's motion to dismiss when the plaintiffs first 
rested. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTAB-
LISH BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE A PRIMA-FACIA 
CASE FOR RELIEF AGAINST MAJESTIC. 
The statute upon which the suit is based is contained 
in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 14, Chapter 2, Para-
graph 2. (Cited for brevity's sake as UCA 14-2-2) which 
provides inter alia and in effect that Majestic is person-
ally (presumably corporately) liable to all persons who 
have not been paid who performed labor under Pepper's 
contract. 
In substance the statute provides that if Majestic had 
a contract with Pepper in excess of $500.00 and did not 
require of him that he post a bond as required by 14-2-1 
for the protection of the workmen, that Majestic is liable 
together with Pepper for the reasonable value of the work 
performed and unpaid provided that the reasonable value 
does not exceed the agreed value. 
Needless to say, the plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving their case by competent evidence. The necessary 
elements of proof would be: 
1. The existence of a contract between Ma-
jestic and Pepper in excess of $500.00. 
2. The failure of Majestic to require and the 
failure of Pepper to post a bond. 
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3. The number of hours worked before Aug-
ust 13th, 1962 and the rate of compensation per 
hour Pepper had agreed to pay them. 
4. The number of hours worked after August 
13th, 1962 and the rate of compensation Pepper 
had agreed to pay them. 
5. That the agreed rate both before and after 
August 13th, 1962 was a reasonable rate. 
6. That they had not been paid. (Payment is 
ordinarily the duty of the defending party to 
prove, but it is counsel's private theory that in 
suits under the bonding law, that non-payment is 
the burden of the plaintiffs to prove.) 
By sifting the evidence, there is probably enough in 
the record to prove elements No. 1 and No. 2. Element 
No.3 and Element No. 4 fail miserably. The plaintiffs act 
like it is difficult for them to testify to something as sim-
pie as their hours worked and their rate of pay. Of course 
the checks and the invoices are in evidence, and were 
properly admitted for the purpose of laying a foundation 
for the release agreement hereinafter referred to. But, 
admitting the checks and invoices for the purpose of 
proving hours worked and rate of compensation is not 
only to rely on incompetent hearsay evidence but to rely 
on evidence, the hearsay nature of which is geometrically 
compounded. 
Written documents, when introduced to prove a fact 
stated thereon, are themselves hearsay evidence. When 
the documents are prepared by somone who has learned 
the information he puts on the documents from someone 
else, this compounds the hearsay. 
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Element No. 6 is also unproven, but since counsel's 
theory on this point has never been decided, the most that 
can be hoped for here is that the court might indulge it-
self in some dictwn to clarify the matter for future liti-
gants. 
While plaintiffs' counsel pursued with commendable 
perserverance and diligence, his theory that Majestic 
had only paid the wages earned since August 13th, the 
plaintiffs failed to make their point, and the evidence 
leaves us with proof on two of the elements of a cause of 
action and with nothing on the other four elements. There 
is not one word in the record as to the nwnber of hours 
worked, the rate of pay, the reasonableness of the rate 
and the fact of non-payment, and the actions of the plain-
tiffs and Pepper create some grave suspicions as to why 
they withheld from the court the direct evidence they 
were undisputedly capable of giving. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS DEFEATED BY AN 
AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENT, WHICH IS AT L.EAST 
A VALID RELEASE OF ONE OF TWO JOINT OBLI-
GORS WITH RIGHTS RESERVED AGAINST THE 
OTHER. 
The psychology of the plaintiffs appears to persuade 
the court that they will be turned away without just 
compensation for their work if they are not given judg-
ment against Majestic, and to engage the court in some 
sub-conscious speculation that since Pepper's checks 
bounced and Majestic's didn't that Pepper isn't solvent 
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and that if Majestic isn't held for the obligation, the 
plaintiffs simply won't be paid. There is, of course, .noth-
ing in the record on this matter and as a matter of law, 
for whatever it's worth, the plaintiffs still have a valid 
claim against Pepper, although it is hard to understand 
why the memorandum decision, findings, conclusions, and 
judgment do not even mention Pepper and his responsi-
bility to these plaintiffs .. 
A cursory reading of the applicable statute, however, 
shows that its obvious intent and purpose is to make any 
person subject to its provision contingently 'but jointly 
liable with the primary obligor, who is the contractor, 
for .the unpaid bills. The statute does not expressly or 
inferentially release the contractor and substitute the 
owner in his place as being the sole party liable to whom 
the unpaid workman must look for satisfaction. The con-
tractor's liability to the workmen survives and the owner's 
liability to the workmen is added. The only time a prob-
lem in cases like this arises is when the owner pays the 
contractor and· the contractor forgets, neglects, or refuses 
to pay the workmen, and the unfortunate owner finds 
himself in the same position. as the hapless accommoda-
sion co-signer on a promissory note who finds out that 
the principal obligor isn't going to perform. 
Since the law in Utah on the matter of joint obliga-
tions has been codified in Chapter 4, of Title 15 of Utah 
Code Annotated, it will be of little consequence to review 
the matter of joint obligations and the legal consequences 
that flowed from releases given by creditors to one of 
two joint obligors at Common Law. It should be observed 
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however, that there never was a time, at least in contract 
law, when a ·creditor "couldn't deal separately with ope of 
two obligors on any terms he chose to deal. His separate· 
dealings did not affect the rights of the two, debtors 
against each other. It simply affected the rights ~f the 
creditor as first against one and secondly against the 
other debtor.· 
Under the facts of the instant case, Majestic fo-und 
itself in the position of having paid once for the work to 
Pepper and then being confronted with a second demand 
by Pepper's ·creditors because Majestic didn't require of 
Pepper that he post a bond as required by law and Pep-
per forgot to pay his workmen. There is absolutely no 
reason why Majestic, Pepper and the Plaintiffs could not 
deal with each other on any ·basis they saw fit. The 
plaintiffs were the creditors and Pepper and Majestic 
were the joint ·debtors. The three parties, the plaintiffs 
separately as one party, Majestic as the second party and 
Pepper as the third party after their mutual ~onfronta­
tion, simply agreed tri-laterally that Majestic would 
honor the plaintiffs' so-called "invoices" at face value. 
Pepper would pay any balance owing to the plaintiffs 
and the plaintiffs would release Majestic from any fur-
ther liability. What a simply uncomplicated arrangement 
and what a wonderful way for businessmen to resolve 
their disputes. 
While it is submitted that the language In 15-4-4, 
and 15-5-5, is more helpful in Tort law than in Contract 
law (Torts being expressly included by the provisions 
of 15-1-1) it is submitted that the worst consequence 
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that could follow Mc~.j estic under the facts of this case 
would be those defined in 15-4-5, and the defenses 
available under 15-4-5 against the plaintiff would be 
those available to Pepper. Which of the two sub-para-
graphs of 15-4-5 would apply here would depend on 
the plaintiffs' knowledge of the respective extent that 
Majestic and Pepper were severally primarily obligated 
to the plaintiffs. Since the primary obligation was that 
of Pepper's and Majestic was simply the guarantor by 
operation of law, it seems to be useless mental exercise 
to try to interpret in the light of 15-4-5 how much 
credit Pepper can .claim against the plaintiffs for the 
monies that Majestic paid to them. 
To talk about the sufficiency or lack of sufficiency 
of consideration at this point is to get ahead of the 
story, but since its importance permeates the proceedings 
it -may be well to consider its bearing upon this point, 
although its full significance will be considered in the 
next point in this brief. 
Since respondents' trial brief has been made a part 
of the trial record (pages 36 through 39) and since the 
conclusions of law mention the question of consideration, 
its presence in respondents' brief may be fairly antici-
pated and its bearing on this question analyzed. 
Counsel cites (on page 37 of the record) a very fun-
damental principle of contract law, namely that a promise 
(including a release) not supported by consideration is 
unenforceable, and a release which relies upon the per-
formance of a pre-existing legal duty as the consideration 
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Now it is important here to bear .in mind that 
Humpherys was scarcely aware that the plaintiffs even 
existed until they started making demands upon him. 
Their total claims consisted of some of Pepper's bounced 
checks that were given to pay for wages allegedly earned 
before August 13th, for a. saw rental, and for some 
allegedly unpaid wages earned after August 13th. In 
the settlement negotiations, no attempt was made to 
differentiate between the three items. Invoices prepared 
by Pepper were presented by the plaintiffs and paid by 
Majestic and each invoice reflects an amount that could 
not possibly have been earned in one week by the work-
men, and $80.00 of the bounced checks represents pay-
ment for a "saw rental!" The argument made against the 
validity of the releases is that the very existence of the 
bounced checks liquidated the claim for wages until Au-
gust 13th. If it had been the checks of Majestic that had 
bounced, this would be a rather strong argument, o~ if 
the checks were being used against Pepper, they would 
be rather conclusive evidence against ·him, but when Pep-
per's checks are used against Majestic they leave much 
to be desired. Since Majestic had no knowledge of the 
existence of Pepper's bounced checks until later, their 
existence can hardly be said to be an admission of Ma-
jestic or any other legal significance as between the 
plaintiffs and Majestic. 
As to the unpaid wages accruing after August 13th, 
it can hardly be asserted that this was a liquidated 
amount. The plaintiffs never worked under Majestic or 
even under any of Majestic's employees. No time cards 
were turned in to Majestic. 
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There was no way of knowing whether the plain-
tiffs came to work late, confined their coffee-breaks to 
pauses of acceptable length, slept or loafed on the job, 
left for and came back from lunch periods at the correct 
times, never went home early, and worked with reason-
able diligence while on the job. Nor was there any profit 
in Majestic's pursuing this question at any length. Im-
portant is only the fact that the plaintiffs were to present 
"invoices," which Majestic paid without question, in 
order to get rid of a vague, bothersome claim of some 
workmen who allegedly hadn't been paid by their em-
ployer. Now how can anything be more un-liquidated 
and more questionable than this claim? 
Aside from the question of liquidity, there is the 
question of the presence or absence of a dispute. The 
interrogation of Dr. Humpherys went on endlessly with 
monotonous repetition in an attempt to establish the 
fact that the whole dispute between Majestic and the 
Plaintiffs was because Dr. Humphreys quarrelled with 
his legal liability to pay these men (because he, like 
most owners didn't even know the bonding statute 
existed), but did not have a bona-fide quarrel with the 
amount of the workman's claim. There may be two 
schools of though as to whether the plaintiffs succeeded 
in establishing that the dispute was the former and not 
the latter question, but it really doesn't matter. The 
question is more academic than practical. 
To illustrate the point that there is no difference 
whether the dispute is as to amount, liability, or both, 
assume that two cars collide in an open intersection, 
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given for its validity, must fail for lack of an independent 
and separate consideration. This is an obviously true 
statement and hardly merits further comment. How-
ever, this principle is not very helpful in the case at 
hand. It merely says that if a debtor owes a creditor the 
sum of $100.00 and the debtor pays the creditor $50.00 for 
a full release of his liability, the agreement of the 
creditor to accept a lesser sum than the full sum is void 
for lack of consideration and the creditor may pursue 
the collection of the balance. No one can quarrel with 
this proposition. It's obviously true. 
This is completely different than a situation where 
the Debtor No. 1 is primarily indebted to the Creditor 
and Debtor No. 2 is jointly and contingently liable to 
the Creditor because of a contractual undertaking or by 
operation of law. Now what is there about the admittedly 
true principle of law urged by plaintiffs' counsel· which 
would prevent the Creditor from dealing separately with 
Debtor ·No. 2, accepting partial payment from him, re-
leasing him, and looking only then to Debtor No.1 for the 
balance? Now this may precipitate a quarrel between 
Debtor No. 1 and Debtor No.2, and may give Debtor No. 
1 some windfall defenses if the Creditor hasn't been 
requisitely circumspect in his observance of the require-
ments of UCA 15-4-4 and 15-5-5, but that isn't going to 
change the legal status between the Creditor and 
Debtor No. 2. 
Stated differently, who would question the right 
of an accommodation co-maker who, when he finds that 
his co-debtor friend is faltering in the payment of his 
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Pepper owes the plaintiffs a liquidated and undis-
puted debt for bounced checks of $100.00. The 
plaintiffs have another claim against Pepper for 
unpaid wages earned after August 13th. Assume 
that Pepper disputed this claim. Pepper pays 
$100.00 in return for the plaintiffs' agreement to 
accept the $100.00 as payment of both claims. 
There wouldn't be sufficient consideration for the 
plaintiffs' agreement to release Pepper from the 
second claim, since Pepper has only paid what he 
was under a duty to pay. 
This makes good sense. But where does it leave us 
when we interject a third party into the illustration? 
Assume the plaintiffs claim that both Pepper and 
Majestic owe the plaintiffs a sum of money for 
bounced checks. While as to Pepper the claim 
may be unliquidated and disputed, Majestic 
doesn't know anything about it (part of one check 
being given to cover $80.00 in a saw rental). The 
plaintiffs also have another claim against both 
Pepper and Majestic for wages earned after 
August 13th. Pepper accepts this, thinking Ma-
jestic is going to have to pay it anyway, and helps 
the plaintiffs prepare invoices to present to Ma-
jestic. Majestic doesn't know anything about the 
workmen's hours, rate of pay, or anything else, 
so as to Majestic, it is reasonably and honestly 
disputed, not only as to amount, but as to the 
more fundamental question of liability. Majestic 
pays the "invoices" at face value without attempt-
ing to differentiate between bounced checks, saw 
rental, and wages, in order to get rid of, once and 
for all, a troublesome claim, meritorious or not. 
Plaintiffs agree to accept the payment as payment 
in full from Majestic and to release Majestic from 
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all further liability of any kind. Now will some-
one argue that because Majestic only paid the 
amount that Pepper was under a primary duty 
(and Majestic perhaps under a contingent second-
ary liability) to pay anyway that Majestic isn't 
released? Especially when the rights were · re-
served as against Pepper when the plaintiffs ac-
cepted the money from Majestic? 
The evidence on the question of what really hap-
pened hardly needs further summation. ·Each of the 
plaintiffs as well as Humpherys and Pepper all told the 
identical story. While they didn't like it, and protested, 
they signed written releases anyway and all of them 
testified that they intended the documents to constitute 
full and complete releases. While the wording and dic-
tion used to evidence the plaintiffs' intent to release are 
not the best chosen lawyer-words for the purpose· (they 
were drafted by a layman), together with the oral testi-
mony of the parties they leave no room for doubt that 
that parties intended them to be full and complete re-
leases of any and all claims. The plaintiffs seek to avoid 
their effect not on the basis of factual intent, but' rather 
on the basis of legal insufficiency of the consideration. 
The whole attack on the releases has been launched 
along the lines of legal insufficiency of consideration and 
not along the lines of factual intent. 
Plaintiffs rely entirely on the rule stated in 12 Am 
Jur, Page 582, Section 88, which says: 
"The performance or promise of performance of 
a legal duty imposed by law or arising from the 
contract with the other party is insufficient con-
sideration for a promise." 
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A reading of the cases cited in the voluminous foot-
notes to this section readily discloses that in each case 
cited, said section is dealing with an agreement to com-
promise a liquidated and undisputed debt. One needs 
only to read the following section 12 Am Jur Contract, 
Section 89, page 5 83, to see that: 
"Even in jurisdictions (adhering to the rule) the 
courts have frequently criticized the reasonable-
ness or fairness of the rule. Since the rule is not 
favored, the decisions indicate in a striking man-
ner the extreme ingenuity of the courts in avoid-
ing its operation." 
Of course, section 88 and 89 deal generally with the 
problem of consideration in contracts, and do not focus 
on the question of consideration in release contracts, a 
special kind of contract, and so is full of general state-
ments not helpful to the question at bar. Special treat-
ment to this problem of releases is given in 45 Am Jur 
Releases, Section 13, where emphasis is lent to the 
proposition that the partial payment of a liquidated and 
debt. Conversely, if the debt is unliquidated or disputed, 
the opposite rule applies. 
The Restatement of Contracts, Volume 1, Section 76 
sets forth the correct principle in illustration No. 4: 
"A owes B a debt which is unliquidated, or of 
which either the existence or amount is honestly 
and reasonable disputed. A payment of any 
amount by A is sufficient consideration for B's 
agreement to accept it in full satisfaction. 
This is the co:Qtrolling statement of law on this fourth 
and final point, for the following undeniable reasons: 
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(1) While Majestic may have had a statutory 
secondary and contingent liability to the plaintiffs, 
it had no then presently existing and ascertained 
duty to them. 
(2) Majestic's liability was exceedingly doubt-
ful and the subject of an honest and reasonable 
dispute between it and the plaintiffs. 
(3') There was no then presently existing legal 
duty established by the Pepper-Majestic contract 
and there was no contractual relationship between 
Majestic and the plaintiffs and 
( 4) The fact that the statute requires the 
owner to pay unpaid wages on construction jobs 
if the contractor does not pay them in the event no 
bond is furnished as required, creates only a con-
tingent and not a presently existing duty. It 
would require a law suit and a judgment to liqui-
date the claim against the contingent co-obligor, 
Majestic. 
The requirements of a valid accord and satisfaction 
are set forth in 1 Am Jur Accord and Satisfaction, Page 
217, Sec. 4. 
"The Discharge of claims by way of accord and 
satisfaction is depende,nt upon an (accord and 
satisfaction) contract, express or implied, and it 
follows that the essentials necessary to valid c.on-
tracts generally must be present in a contract of 
accord and satisfaction. Therefore, the following 
elements are essential: (1) a proper subject mat-
ter (2) competent parties (3) an assent or meet-
ing of the minds of the parties and ( 4) a consider-
ation." 
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For a more thorough treatment of the subject and 
for authority to the effect that an accord and satisfaction 
need not be in writing (although it is in writing in the 
instant case) see 75 ALR 905, Section 3. At Page 916 
we read: 
"Generally where the amount is unliquidated or 
disputed, and a remittance of an amount less than 
that claimed is sent to the creditor, together with 
a statement that it is full satisfaction of the claim, 
and the tender is accompanied by such acts or 
declarations as amount to a condition that, if the 
remittance is accepted, it is accepted in full satis-
faction of the disputed claim, and the creditor 
is aware of such conditions, the acceptance of such 
remittance constitutes an accord and satisfaction, 
although the creditor protests at the time that the 
amount tendered is not accepted in full satisfac-
tion.'' 
In this connection, it should be borne in mind that 
not only were written releases signed and delivered, the 
settlement checks of Majestic to the workmen contain 
within their four corners similar language pertaining to 
release, were issued only after extended disputes and 
contentions as to amount and liability on the part of 
Majestic, and were accompanied by statements on both 
sides that this was a complete and final release and that 
unless the plaintiffs agreed to release Majestic com-
.pletely, they wouldn't get their checks. The plaintiffs 
did sign, they did release, and they did get their money. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that upon finding estoppel, the bal-
ance of the questions raised by this brief are moot, like-
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wise upon finding no prima-facia case, the remaining two 
questions are unnecessary to treat, and upon finding a 
release of one of two obligors that the last question is 
academic, and there failing, a finding of a valid release 
is a bar to any recovery by the plaintiffs, but that a 
finding on any one of the four issues is grounds to reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and that the evidence and 
the law allows for no conclusions other than a finding on 
each of the four points in favor of the defendant Majestic 
and against the plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT 
Attorney for the Defendant-
Appellant, Majestic 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing to Heber Grant 
Ivins, Attorney for the Plaintiffs, 75 North Center, 
American Fork, Utah, this 12th day of January, 1965. 
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